State v. Tinoco Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 39659 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
2-11-2013
State v. Tinoco Appellant's Brief Dckt. 39659
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Tinoco Appellant's Brief Dckt. 39659" (2013). Not Reported. 745.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/745
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 











S.Ct. No. 39659-2012 
vs. District Case No. CR-2011-8142-C 
JORGE FERREIRA TINOCO, 
Appellant. 
Robyn Fyffe 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District of the State ofldaho 
In and For the County of Canyon 
HONORABLE BRADLEY S. FORD 
District Judge 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 West Bannock 
Idaho Attorney General 
Criminal Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
(208) 334-2400 
Attorneys for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Table of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . n 
II. Statement of the Case ....................................................... 1 
A. Nature of the Case ................................................. 1 
B. Factual Summary and General Course of Proceedings ..................... 1 
III. Issues Presented on Appeal .................................................. 4 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Tinoco's motion to dismiss because the delay in 
bringing him to trial violated the speedy trial guarantee protected by LC.§ 19-3501, the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution? 
IV. Argument ................................................................ 4 
A. The District Court Erred in Denying Mr. Tinoco' s Motion to Dismiss Because the 
Delay in Bringing Him to Trial Violated His Speedy Trial Rights ............ 4 
1. The reason for the delay ....................................... 6 
2. Mr. Tinoco asserted his right to a speedy trial ...................... 7 
3. Prejudice to Mr. Tinoco and the length of the delay ................. 8 
4. Conclusion ................................................. 8 
V. Conclusion ............................................................... 9 
I. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) .............................................................................. 5, 6, 7, 8 
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) ............................................................................. 7 
STATE CASES 
State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 16 P .3d 931 (2000) ............................................................... 4, 5, 6 
State v. Jacobson, 153 Idaho 377,283 P.3d 124 (Ct. App. 2012) ........................................ 5, 6, 7 
State v. Livas, 147 Idaho 547,211 P.3d 792 (Ct. App. 2009) ....................................................... 5 
State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 160 P.3d 1284 (Ct. App. 2007) .................................................... 7 
State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 29 P.3d 949 (2001) .................................................................. 5, 8 
STATE STATUTES 
Idaho Code§ 19-3501 ............................................................................................................... 5, 6 
11 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from Mr. Jorge Tinoco's judgment of conviction and sentences for 
trafficking in methamphetamine and delivery of a controlled substance. 
B. Factual Summary and General Course of Proceedings 
According to the State, in February 2011, an undercover officer called Mr. Tinoco and 
asked him to obtain two pounds of methamphetamine. Tr. Vol. 6, p. 23, In. 2 - p. 24, In. 25; p. 
63, In. 11-24. The transaction fell through and in March, Mr. Tinoco allegedly told the 
undercover officer that he would call when he had some available. Id at p. 26, In. 13 - p 28, In. 
20. In mid-March, the undercover officer indicated that Mr. Tinoco informed him there were 
three pounds of methamphetamine available. Id. at p. 31, In. 21 - p. 33, In. 6; p. 194, In. 9 - p. 
196, In. 25. Mr. Tinoco allegedly traveled to Idaho with his brother Rodolfo Ferreira. 
According to the undercover officer, he and Mr. Tinoco agreed to meet at a local truck-
stop after Mr. Tinoco arrived. Id at p. 35, In. 16 - p. 36, In. 25. At the truck-stop, the 
undercover officer entered a vehicle with Mr. Tinoco and his nephew Omar and Mr. Tinoco 
allegedly gave the undercover officer a small amount of methamphetamine. Id. at p. 40, In. 12 -
p. 44, In. 13. The undercover officer agreed to come to Omar's apartments to purchase the larger 
quantity of methamphetamine. Id. at p. 45, In. 8-12. Law enforcement obtained a search warrant 
for Omar's apartments and found approximately three pounds of methamphetamine in a storage 
shed. Id. at p. 81, In. 7-17; p. 86, In. 16 - p. 89, In. 8. Police also discovered that the passenger 
air-bag in the vehicle that Mr. Tinoco drove from California had been removed such that the area 
could be used as a storage compartment. Id. at p. 129, In. 1 - p. 130, In. 3. 
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Mr. Tinoco was arrested and charged via complaint with trafficking in more than 400 
grams of methamphetamine and delivery of a controlled substance. C.R. Vol. 1, p. 8-11. Mr. 
Ferreira was charged in a different case. See id. at p. 36-38. Mr. Tinoco was unable to post the 
$500,000 bond. See ROA; C.R. p. 62, 78. On April 7, 2011, the State filed an indictment 
charging Mr. Tinoco with the same offenses. C.R. Vol. 1, p. 16-17. Mr. Tinoco pied not guilty 
and asserted his right to speedy trial on April 15, 2011. C.R. p. 24-25. Trial was initially 
scheduled for July 6, 2011 and was re-scheduled for August 16, 2011, because the grand jury 
transcript had not yet been prepared. Id. at p. 30-31. 
The day following the pre-trial conference, on July 26, 2011, the State finally moved to 
consolidate Mr. Tinoco's case with Mr. Ferreira's. C.R. Vol. 1, p. 36-37. Mr. Ferreira objected 
to the consolidation in part because the State had unduly delayed in seeking consolidation. Tr. 
Vol. 3, p. 11-13. The district court agreed that the motion to consolidate was untimely but found 
Mr. Tinoco and Mr. Ferreira had sufficient notice prior to trial and granted the motion. Id. at p. 
41-42. On August 8, 2011, Mr. Ferreira moved to sever his trial from Mr. Tinoco's, which the 
district court denied. C.R. Vol. 1, p. 48-49, p. 66-73. 
On September 20, 2011, during the course of jury selection, Mr. Tinoco noted the State 
improperly used its peremptory challenges to strike the majority of Hispanic jurors. C.R. Vol. 1, 
p. 98-112. Prior to the jury being seated and sworn, both defense counsel informed the district 
court of the Batson violation and counsel understood the district court indicated that it would 
hear argument on the challenge later in the day after the jury had been seated. C.R. Vol. 1, p. 
103, 111-12. The jury was then sworn and the district court later ruled that the Batson challenge 
was waived because Mr. Tinoco did not raise the issue prior to the jury being sworn. Id. at p. 95-
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96. However, the district court acknowledged that the in-chambers discussion could have misled 
counsel and that a mistrial was appropriate. Tr. Vol. 5, p. 32, In. 12-17. The trial was then re-set 
for November 1, 2011, which was eighteen days beyond the speedy trial period. 
Mr. Tinoco moved to dismiss because the delay of his trial beyond October 12, 2011 
violated his rights to a speedy trial under I.C. § 19-350land the Idaho and United States 
Constitutions. C.R. Vol. 1, p. 129-131. Mr. Tinoco noted that the delay in his case was initially 
created by the State's decision to wait until July to seek to join the cases. Id. at p. 132. The case 
was further delayed by the State's suspect use of peremptory challenges to exclude Hispanics 
from the jury and the district court's erroneous insistence that the jury be seated and sworn prior 
to taking up the Batson challenge. Id. Because the reason for the delay was not compelling, 
dismissal was warranted even though the trial was only delayed eighteen days beyond the speedy 
trial time period. Id. at p. 131-33. Mr. Tinoco also noted that he had been continuously 
incarcerated and was prejudiced by the delay because the State obtained fingerprint evidence 
following the mistrial suggesting he had handled the packaging in which the methamphetamine 
in the storage shed was found. Tr. Vol. 5, p. 23, In. 5-23. 
The district court found that the delay outside the speedy trial period was due to the 
district court's error in creating confusion regarding the Batson issue, which necessitated the 
mistrial. Tr. Vol. 5, p. 31, In. 22 - p. 32, In. 11. However, the district court denied the motion, 
finding that the case was brought to trial in a timely fashion and then "simply reset for trial after 
the mistrial." Id. at p. 36, In. 5-10. The district court further found that the district court's error 
constituted good cause for the delay, that Mr. Tinoco joined the motion for the mistrial to ensure 
he had a fair trial, that the delay was short and that prejudice has been minimal. Id. at p. 36, In. 
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12-23. 
Mr. Tinoco was found guilty following trial. C.R. Vol. 2, p. 187-89. The district court 
sentenced Mr. Tinoco to a unified term of twenty-three years with a minimum period of 
confinement of ten years for trafficking and a concurrent term of fifteen years with a minimum 
period of confinement of ten years for delivery. Id. at p. 228-29. This appeal follows. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Tinoco's motion to dismiss because the delay in 
bringing him to trial violated the speedy trial guarantee protected by I.C. § 19-3501, the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred in Denying Mr. Tinoco's Motion to Dismiss Because the 
Delay in Bringing Him to Trial Violated His Speedy Trial Rights 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the 
Idaho Constitution guarantee a speedy trial. These constitutional rights are supplemented by 
Idaho statute which provides that the "court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must 
order the ... indictment to be dismissed ... if a defendant, whose trial has not been postponed 
upon his application, is not brought to trial within [ six months] from the date that the defendant 
was arraigned." LC.§ 19-3501(3) (emphasis added). Whether there was an infringement of a 
defendant's right to a speedy trial presents a mixed question oflaw and fact. State v. Clark, 135 
Idaho 255,257, 16 P.3d 931, 933 (2000). Thus, this Court defers to the trial court's findings of 
fact if supported by substantial and competent evidence while exercising free review of the trial 
court's conclusions oflaw. Id. 
The reason for the delay lies at the heart of a good cause determination under LC. § 
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19-3501 and the State bears the burden to demonstrate good cause for a failure to bring a 
defendant to trial within the six-month limit. Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936; State v. 
Livas, 147 Idaho 547, 549, 211 P.3d 792, 794 (Ct. App. 2009). "Good cause" means that there 
was a substantial reason for the delay that rises to the level of a legal excuse. State v. Young, 136 
Idaho 113, 116, 29 P.3d 949,952 (2001); Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936. 
Although the analysis should focus upon the reason for the delay, the reason cannot be 
evaluated entirely in a vacuum and a good cause determination may take into account the 
additional factors listed in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). See Clark, 135 Idaho at 
260, 16 P.3d at 936. Thus, when they bear on the sufficiency or strength of the reason for the 
delay, a court may also consider (1) the length of the delay; (2) whether the defendant asserted 
the right to a speedy trial; and (3) the prejudice to the defendant. 
Id. at 380,283 P.3d 124,283 P.3d at 127. 
Nevertheless, if the reason for the delay is insufficient, the other factors will not avail to 
avoid dismissal. Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936; State v. Jacobson, 153 Idaho 377,380, 
283 P.3d 124, 127 (Ct. App. 2012). "Where the reason for the delay is well defined, and that 
reason on its face clearly does, or clearly does not, constitute good cause, there is no occasion to 
consider the other Barker factors in assessing a claimed violation of Idaho Code § 19-3501. 
Jacobson, 153 Idaho at 380,283 P.3d at 127. Thus, courts only resort to the other Barker factors 
"in close cases as where, for example, there are multiple reasons for the delay attributable to both 
the State and the defendant or the sufficiency of the reason to constitute 'good cause' is 
genuinely subject to disagreement." Jacobson, 153 Idaho at 380, 283 P.3d at 127. 
Here, Mr. Tinoco's trial was delayed beyond the speedy trial time period because the 
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district court misled counsel as to when the Batson challenge could be heard, which ultimately 
required the district court to declare a mistrial. Because there was no good cause for the delay, 
the district court erred in denying Mr. Tinoco' s motion to dismiss regardless of the length of the 
delay and prejudice. Even if the reason for the delay was sufficient to warrant consideration of 
the Barker factors, that reason and the prejudice to Mr. Tinoco cannot justify even the eighteen 
day delay in this case. Accordingly, this Court should reverse Mr. Tinoco' s judgment of 
conviction and sentences and remand this case with instruction to grant the motion to dismiss. 
1. The reason for the delay 
The prosecution and the trial court have the primary burden to ensure that cases are 
brought to trial in a timely manner. Barker, 407 U.S. at 529; Jacobson, 153 Idaho at 380,283 
P.3d at 127. In Jacobson, the trial court incorrectly determined the deadline for a trial date 
within the speedy trial time frame. The Court reasoned that if, "as our Supreme Court held in 
Clark, a trial court's overcrowded trial calendar does not constitute good cause, then the mistake 
that occurred here, which might properly be characterized as negligence, cannot amount to good 
cause justifying the delay of a defendant's trial beyond the Idaho Code§ 19-3501 time limit." 
Jacobson, 153 Idaho at 380,283 P.3d at 127. The Court further concluded that the absence of 
good cause warranted dismissal without considering other factors because "an utter absence of 
good cause cannot be 'outweighed' by other Barker factors." Id 
Mr. Tinoco's trial was delayed: 
because of an issue arising from [the] Court's communication, and perhaps 
misleading to the attorneys off the record as to taking up the Batson challenge, 
and then recommencing the trial without addressing the Batson challenge. There 
was sufficient error on the record at the time the motion for mistrial was raised by 
the defendants ... [ and] the Court accepted responsibility for the mistrial. That is 
the reason for the delay. I do not find it was delay caused by the State or Defense 
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in this case, but, in fact, the Court. 
Tr. Vol. 5, p. 31, In. 24 - p. 32, In. 11. 
If a congested calendar or miscalculating the speedy trial period cannot be good cause, 
than the district court's error in misleading counsel regarding the timing of the Batson challenge 
does not justify setting the trial outside the speedy trial period. Although the district court's 
conduct was unintentional, negligence is not automatically tolerable simply because the accused 
cannot demonstrate exactly how it has prejudiced him or her. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S . 
• 647, 657 (1992). Because there was no good cause for the delay, the district court erred in 
denying the motion to dismiss regardless of whether the additional Barker factors also weigh 
towards dismissal. 
2. Mr. Tinoco asserted his right to a speedy trial 
Neither the parties nor the Court indicated on the record at the time the mistrial was 
granted that the new trial date was outside the speedy trial period. Tr. Vol. 5, p. 27, In. 6-11. 
Nonetheless, the prosecution and the trial court bear the duty to timely bring a defendant to trial. 
Jacobson, 153 Idaho at 380 n.2, 283 P.3d at 127, n.2; State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349,354, 160 
P.3d 1284, 1289 (Ct. App. 2007). 
Further, Mr. Tinoco does not bear the responsibility for the previous delays in his case. 
The trial was initially reset as a result of the State's inexplicit decision to wait until the eve of 
trial to seek to consolidate his case with Mr. Ferreira's and Mr. Ferreira's challenges to that 
consolidation. Accordingly, as found by the district court, Mr. Tinoco "stood on his speedy trial 
rights" throughout the proceedings." Tr. Vol. 5, p. 33, In. 18-21. 
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3. Prejudice to Mr. Tinoco and the length of the delay 
Prejudice is to be assessed in light of the interests that the right to a speedy trial is 
designed to protect: (1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize anxiety and 
concern of the accused; and (3) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Young, 
136 Idaho at 118, 29 P.3d at 954. Prejudice is the most significant because a hindrance to 
adequate preparation of the defense skews the fairness of the entire system. Barker, 407 U.S. at 
532;. 
Here, Mr. Tinoco was continuously incarcerated and undoubtedly suffered much anxiety 
and concern while awaiting trial. Additionally, fingerprint evidence implicating Mr. Tinoco 
became available after the speedy trial period. Under some circumstances, courts attach great 
weight to considerations such as the state's need for time to collect evidence. See Barker, 407 
U.S. at 531. In this situation however, the State had been prepared to go to trial without this 
evidence and, thus, it must not have been able to sufficiently justify the laboratory's delay to 
warrant continuing the case outside of the speedy trial period. Because the district court's error 
resulted in a continuance, the State was granted a windfall in gaining additional time to put its 
case together. 
4. Conclusion 
Mr. Tinoco's trial was delayed outside the speedy trial period because of the district 
court's error. Because the reason for the delay cannot constitute "good cause," the case should 
have been dismissed without resorting to analysis of the other Barker factors. Even when those 
factors are considered, the circumstances demonstrate that Mr. Tinoco's right to speedy trial was 
violated and that the case should have been dismissed. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Tinoco respectfully asks that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and 
sentences and remand for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this Jl_ day of Feb 
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